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Employee Retirement and a Firm's Pension Plan
ABSTRACT
The provisions of the pension plan in a large corporation are described
in detail. The implications of the provisions are indicated by pension accrual
profiles. These profiles are set forth, together with standard age-earnings
and Social Security accrual profiles, in the form of life-time budget constraints.
The plan provided very strong incentives to retire beginning at age 55. After
age 65, negative pension and negative Social Security accruals effectively impose
almost a 100 percent tax rate on wage earnings for many employees of the firm.
Departure rates from the firm are compared with economic incentives inherent
in the plan provisions. The inducements in the plan provisions to retire early
have had a very substantial effect on departure rates from the firm. Over 50
percent of those employed by the firm at age 50 leave before 60 and 90 percent
before age 65. The jumps in departure rates at specific ages coincide precisely
with the discontinuities and kink points in the worker compensation profiles
that result from the pension plan provisions together with wage earnings profiles
and Social Security accrual.
Laurence J. Kotlikoff David A. Wise
NBER Kennedy School of Government
1050 Massachusetts Avenue Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138-2-
In this paper, the relationship between pension accrual and retirement is
analyzed, based on the experience in a large Fortune 500 firm engaged in
sales. It's name may not be disclosed. The data are the employment and
earnings histories between 1969 and 1984 of all workers who were employed by
the firm in any of years between 1980 and 1984. The provisions of the firm
pension plan are such that persons of the same age face very different pension
accrual profiles, and thus pension compensation at a given age. Hence,
different individuals face very different incentives for continued work versus
retirement.
The paper begins with a detailed description of the plan and the
incentive effects inherent in its provisions. The incentive effects of the
provisions are described in terms of their effects on the budget constraints
facing employees over their working lives. For completeness, the accrual of
Social Security benefits is described together with pension benefit accrual.
The evaluation of the incentive effects of plan provisions requires the
estimation of wage earnings. The procedure used to estimate these profiles is
described in the following section.
We then show the relationship between wage earnings, pension wealth
accrual, and Social Security accrual on the one hand and departure rates from
the firm on the other. It is apparent from this relationship that the effect
of the pension plan provisions on departure rates is very substantial. In
subsequent analysis we will develop a model that will allow us to predict the
effect of changes in the provisions on departure rates. That is not possible
based only on the relationships presented here. But the detail shown here
provides information that is often lost in formal statistical models.
The analysis makes clear that estimation of the effects of pension plans
on labor force participation of older workers can only be done by takingEMPLOYEE RETIREMENT AND A FIRM'S PENSIONPLAN
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In previous work we analyzed the incentive effects of the provisions of
private pension plans.' The incentive effects were described by the accrual
of pension wealth resulting from an additional year of work, treating the
addition to pension wealth as a form of compensation in units comparable to
the wage. We found that the provisions of almost all plans implied a large
loss in pension wealth for work past the age of 65. Often this loss was more
than 40 percent of the wage that would be earned for the additional work. In
some plans wage earnings after 65 would be entirely offset by the concomitant
loss in pension wealth. The typical plan also provided substantial incentive
to retire at the age of early retirement provided in the plan. This was often
as young as 55. In addition, the typical plan provides a strong incentive not
to retire before the early retirement age. Although this work documented the
incentive effects inherent in the timing of the accrual of pension benefits,
no attempt was made to estimate the actual effects of these incentives on
retirement. That is, we considered the effect of pension benefit accrual on
compensation by age, but not the effect of compensation on continued labor
force participation. Indeed, based on the data used for that analysis there
was no way to relate the plan provisions to retirement, or to departure rates
from the firm.
'See Kotlikoff and Wise [1985, 1987]-3-
account of the precise provisions of individual plans. Simply knowing that an
employee has a private pension plan tells nothing about the labor force
incentive effects of the plan's provisions. While a great deal of effort has
been directed to estimating the effects of Social Security provisions on labor
force participation, much less attention has been given to the effects of
private pension plans. The data presented here suggests that pension plans
are likely to have a much greater effect than the recent changes in Social
Security benefits, for example.
I.The Firm Pension Plan
A. The Plan Provisions
The firm has a defined benefit pension plan with earnings-related
benefits and a Social Security offset. The plan's early and normal retirement
ages are 55 and 65 respectively with vesting after 10 years. Actuarially
reduced benefits are available starting at age 55 for vested terminators --
vestedworkers who leave the firm prior to age 55. For early retirees --
workerswho retire between ages 55 and 65 -- lessthan actuarially reduced
benefits are provided. For workers who retire after age 65 there is no
special actuarial benefit increase.
In addition to the more favorable benefit reduction afforded to early
retirees, early retirees receive a supplemental benefit equal to their Social
Security offset between the time they retire and the time they reach age 65.
Hence, in comparison to a vested terminator who leaves the firm at age 54 and
starts collecting benefits at age 55, an early retiree who leaves at age 55
enjoys a smaller benefit reduction and also receives a supplemental benefit
until age 65. Not surprisingly, the profile of vested accrued benefits by age.4-
jumps sharply for most workers at age 55. Thus there is a large bonus for
remaining with the firmuntilage 55.
The formula for the basic benefit before reduction for early retirement
and before any applicable Social Security offset is the average earnings base
times x percent times the first N years of continuous service, plus y percent
times the rest of continuous service:
Benefits —(EarningsBase) [(x)(Service)]
if Service is less than N years
(1)
Benefits —(EarningsBase) [(x)(Service) +(y)(Service
-N)]
if Service is greater than N years
The parameters x and y are both less than 0.05 and y is less than x. N lies
between 15 and 30. The average earnings base is calculated based on earnings
between the start year and the year of either vested termination or
retirement. The start year has traditionally been Increased by two years
every other year, varying from k to k+l years before the current year, where k
is between 5 and 10. In our accrual calculations we assume a one or two year
increase in the start year every two years. Excluding the two lowest years of
earnings (except that the number of earnings years used can't be reduced below
five), the earnings base is calculated as the average annual earnings from the
start year to the year of vested termination or retirement.
The Social Security adjustment is (1) p (p lies between 0.5 and 1) of the
Social Security benefit calculated by the firm, denoted SSB, times the ratio
of completed service to the amount of service the worker would have if he or
she stayed until age 65, less (2) Z (Z lies between $1,000 and $5,000) times
the ratio of continuous service as of January 1, 1976 to the continuous
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Here, S is years of service, and S(76) is the years of service the worker had
in 1976. A is the worker's current age. The first term is smaller the
younger the age of retirement, which reduces the adjustment. But if the
worker has pre-1976 service, the second term is also smaller the younger the
retirement age and this increases the adjustment.
The term SSB, the FIRM's calculation of the worker's age 65 Social
Security benefit, is based on the worker's earnings to date with the firm. In
the SSB formula earnings last year are extrapolated forward, assuming no
growth factor, until the worker reaches age 65. The average of past earnings
with the firm as well as extrapolated future earnings is then entered into a
three bracket progressive benefit formula to determine SSB.
For early retirees the factor by which benefits are reduced depends on
age and service. For example, if the worker retires at age 55 with 20 years
of service the reduction is fifty percent; it would be only 33 percent if the
worker had 26 or more years of service. For workers with 30 or more years of
service, the reduction drops to zero at retirement ages between 60 and 64.
The pension accrual can vary widely for workers of the same age, but with
different service and for workers with the same service, but of different
ages. These accrual differences reflect the fact that many of the features of
the benefit and Social Security formulae involve either age or service or
both. Indeed, it is fair to say that the firm's benefit formula could hardly
be better designed from the perspective of maximizing service and age-related
differences in accruals. This variation comes at the cost of a fairly-6-
complicated set of provisions which may not be fully understood by individual
workers.
B. Pension Accrual
To describe the effect of the provisions on pensron wealth, the accrual
profiles for persons born and hired by the firm in several different years
have been calculated for the calendar period beginning in 1980. For each
employee group defined by year of birth and year of hire, accruals are
calculated through age 70; the number of years of accruals that are presented
thus depends on the age of the employee in 1980. One profile is graphed in
Figure 1. It is used as an illustration to explain the derivation of such
profiles. Profiles for different employee and age groups are compared in the
next section.
The graph shows the pension accrual profile for male managers born in
1930 and hired by the firm in 1960. By 1980, they were 50 and had 20 years of
service with the firm. (To calculate pension accrual, we have used the
convention that a person hired in a given year has one year of experience in
that year. Thus in some of the tables shown below, the person used in this
example would be assumed to have 21 years of experience in 1980.) The accrual
is the change in the discounted value of future pension benefit entitlements
for an additional year of employment. The accrual of Social Security benefits
is shown on the same graph. Predicted wage earnings for each year are also
shown. These predictions are based on actual average earnings of firm
employees, by age and years of service. The prediction method is described
and the results are discussed in detail in section II. All of the numbers
presented in this section are in real 1985 dollars.
At age 50, in 1980, the typical male manager has wage earnings of about
$48,446 per year. Compensation in the form of pension accrual is $2,646, or.7-
about 6 percent of wage earnings. If the manger were to retire at this age,
he would be entitled to benefits at 65, based on his earnings in the seven or
eigit preceding years. The benefits would not be available until age 65, and
thus have a relatively low present value at age 50.
As described above, normal retirement benefits could be taken earlier, as
early as age 55, but they would be reduced actuarially such that the present
discounted value of the benefits remains unchanged. The reduction in the
benefit would be just enough to offset the fact that benefits would be
received for more years. If the person remains in the firm until age 55 and
then retires, however, benefits are available immediately and the reduction in
benefits for early retirement is less than the actuarial reduction. In
addition, the worker who remains until age 55 and then retires is eligible to
receive a supplemental benefit until age 65 equal to his Social Security
offset. Thus there is a very large increase in pension wealth at age 55,
$72,527, corresponding to the large spike in the graph. In effect, there is a
bonus of $72,527 for remaining in the firm from age 54 to 55.
After age 55, pension accrual falls, to about 10 percent of the wage at
age 60 (in 1990). Accrual is higher than just before age 55 primarily because
the early retirement reduction factor if the worker remains until 55 is less
than it would be if he left the firm before 55. (If he leaves before 55, the
reduction is actuarially fair.) But as the worker ages beyond 56 this effect
is partially offset by the fact that an additional year of service adds only
1, instead of 2 percent to benefits. Pension accrual is in fact negative
beginning at age 61 (in 1991). Indeed between ages 61 and 65 the loss in
pension benefits is equivalent to about 20 percent of wage compensation.
The loss in compensation between ages 60 and 61 is equivalent to a wage
cut of about 14 percent. The worker has 30 years of service at that age and,-8-
because of the plan's early retirement reduction factors, is already eligible
for full retirement benefits. Thus no increase in benefits will result for
working another year from the application of one fewer year of early
retirement reduction, as was the case before 30 years of service. In
addition, for each year that benefits are not taken between age 55 and 65, the
receipt of benefits for a year without the Social Security adjustment
(reduction) is foregone. This advantage is lost at age 65 (in 1995).
Thereafter, the loss in benefits from working an additional year is smaller
because this formerly foregone opportunity is no longer available. In
addition, the accruals depend on the Social Security adjustment, and to a
small extent on the updating of the years used in the calculation of the
earnings base.
Social Security accruals for the male managers considered in figure la
range from about $1,000 to $8,000 between age 50 and 65. After 65, Social
Security accrual becomes negative, about -$8,500 at age 66.
In summary, the typical manager in the firm, making about $48,000 per
year in wage earnings at age 60, would lose about $42,000 in pension wealth
were he to continue working until age 65. Thus, in addition to the expected
concentration of retirement at age 55, we would expect a large proportion of
this group to retire before 65. After age 65, Social Security benefit accrual
also becomes negative. At 66, the loss in private pension benefits and Social
Security benefits together amounts to about 32 percent of wage earnings at
that age. This suggests a concentration of retirement at 65 as well.
The data in figure la are shown in the standard budget constraint form in
figure lb. Total compensation, including wage earnings, Social Security
wealth, and pension wealth, is graphed against age, beginning in 1980. The
vertical axis shows the total resources that the person would acquire from-9-
employment with this firm. Accumulated earnings before 1980 are ignored in
the graph.
There is a discontinuous jump in the graph at age 55. For reasonable
preferences for income (that can be used for consumption) versus retirement
leisure, one would expect to see a large proportion of workers facing this
constraint retiring at age 55 and most retiring prior to age 65.
Additional graphs showing wage earnings, pension accrual, and Social
Security accrual over the working span are shown in figures 2a and 2b; again,
the first shows accruals by year, and the second shows cumulated amounts in
the standard budget constraint form. These graphs pertain to a male manager
who is hired in 1980, at age 20, and who continues working with the firm until
age 70. For such workers, the pension accrual at age 55 is $168,000,
equivalent to 164 percent of the wage at that age. Wage earnings for this
group reach a maximum at age 59. Pension benefit accrual becomes negative at
age 61, and Social Security benefit accrual becomes negative at age 65. In
the first year of work after age 65 the loss in pension benefits and Social
Security benefits together amounts to $40,000, about 45 percent of wage
earnings at that age. Thus the lifetime budget constraint shows an upward
discontinuity at age 55 and a decline in the rate of wage increase around age
60. The decline is especially abrupt after age 65.2Retirement at age 55,
between 55 and 65, and possibly at 65 would seem to be quite likely for
workers facing budget constraints like this one.
2The decline in this firm at age 65 is likely to be mild compared to that
in many other firms in which the fall in pension accrual at age 65 is much
greater than it is here. See Kotlikoff and Wise [1985 and 1987].-10-
C. Decomposition of Pension Accrual
The calculations underlying the pension accrual in figures la and lb are
explained in this section. The wage earnings and other dollar values in this
section are in current dollars, however, while the graphs are in constant 1985
dollars. The nominal interest rate assumed throughout this analysis is 0.09,
and the real interest is. assumed to equal 0.03.
The calculations are shown in table 1 for male managers who were born in
1930 and hired by the firm in 1960, the same group whose accrual profile is
illustrated in figures la and lb. Columns (1) through (4) are self-
explanatory. Column (5) is the average earnings base used to calculate
pension benefits. The normal retirement benefit is shown in column (6). It
is calculated using the formula in equation 1 above. The Social Security
benefit in column (7) is calculated by the firm based on earnings projected
forward to age 65. Column (8) is the Social Security adjustment shown in
equation 2. Column (9) is (7) minus (8). Column (10) is 1 minus the early
retirement adjustment, the proportion of the benefit that remains after the
adjustment. Once the person has worked for 30 years there is, according to
the firm's early retirement reduction provisions, no reduction even though the
person is only 60 years old at that time.
Column (11) is column (10) times column (6). It is the benefit that a
person who retired early would receive between the early retirement age and
age 65. After age 65, benefits are based on the adjusted retirement benefits,
reduced by the early retirement reduction factor. These benefits are shown in
column (12), which is (10) times (9).
The annuity value of a dollar received each year from 65 until death is
shown in column (13). It accounts for the probability that a person will be
alive at each year in the future. The probability that a person will live-11-
from the current age until 65 is shown in column (14). The current value of a
dollar that will be received at age 65 is shown in column(15). At the
currentage, the present value of the pension benefits that the manager can
receive at age 65 is shownin column (16), and is givenby (12) x (13) x (14)
x (15).
If the manager retires at age 55 or later, he will receive benefits until
age 65 that are not reduced by the Social Security adjustment. He receives
the normal retirement benefits in column (6) reduced only by the early
retirement reduction factor, (10), and shown in column (11). The present
value of these benefits from the year of first collection until age 65 is
shownin column (17). These benefits plus those that will be received after
age65, are the present value of his pension wealth and are shown in column
(18) ((16) plus (17)).
The change in pension wealth from one year to the next, 1(a), the pension
accrual, is shown in column (19). The accrual at age a is given by
(3) 1(a) —Pw(a+l)-Pw(a)(l+r)
wherea is pension wealth and r is the nominal interest rate, taken to be
0.09. Again, these pension accruals, together with Social Security accruals
and the wage, are graphed in figure la above, but in 1985 dollars. The accrual
as a percent of wage earnings is shownincolumn (20).
D.Variation in Accrual Profiles by Age and Year of Hire
The two accrual profiles discussed above pertain to persons who were born
in a given year and who were hired by the firm in a given year. The profile
3For more algebraic detail on the calulation of pension wealth, see
Kotlikoff and Wise [1985].-12-
in the calendar period beginning in 1980 may be quite different for persons of
different ages and with different years of service. Thus, profiles have been
cal-culated for several additional groups, 15 in all, defined by year of birth
and year of hire, as follows:







Pension accruals for managers with these birth and hire years are shown in
table 3. Those born in 1940 reach age 55 in 1995, and for each of these
groups there is a discontinuous increase in pension wealth in that year. It
is $29,639 for those with 15 years of service in that year and $82,953 for
those with 25 years of service. Comparable jumps occur in 1985 for those born
in 1930. Accruals are often negative for persons over 60.
Pension accruals provide a large incentive for some groups to stay in the
firm for another year and strong incentive for others to leave. For example,
staying with the firm in 1985 brings pension accrual of $72,527 for 55 year
old managers with 25 years of service (born in 1930 and hired in 1960), but a
loss of $14,936 for 65 year olds with 35 years of experience (born in 1920 and
hired in 1950). Thus there is enormous variation in the effective
compensation for continued service. One might expect therefore that some
groups would be much more likely than others to retire in a given year.
In some instances there are erratic fluctuations from one year to the
next, from negative to positive to negative for example. This typically-13-
occurs if an increase in benefits in one year is not followed by a comparable
increase in the next. For example, suppose that the normal retirement benefit
is higher in year a than in either year a-l or in year a+l. Then the accrual
from a-i to a will tend to be positive, but the accrual from a to a+l will
tend to be negative. Dropping a low earnings year and adding a higher one in
the calculation of the earnings base may create this effect. Other provisions
in the pension calculation formula may do so as well. For convenience, total
cumulated pension wealth is shown in table 3 for the same groups. Social
Security accruals and cumulated Social Security wealth are shown in tables 4
and 5 respectively. Annual wage earnings and cumulated earnings are shown in
tables 6 and 7.
Graphs of two of the profiles are shown in figures 1 and 2 above; several
others are shown below. Young new hires will have rapid wage growth in the
subsequent 20 years, but very little accrual of pension wealth. This is shown
in figure 2 above for persons born in 1960, and 20 years old at the time of
hire in 1980. Their incomes will rise from about $20,000 in 1980 to over
$70,000 in the year 2000, when they are 40 years old. But even in 2000 their
pension accrual will be only $1,558. Their total accrued pension wealth at
age 40 will be only $11,894, a very small fraction (1.2 percent) of their
total earnings over the period.
A manager hired in 1980, but born in 1940, will have much lower wage
growth over the next 20 years, from about $28,000 in 1980 to under $52,000 at
age 60 in 2000. (See figures 3a and 3b.) This person will also have little
pension wealth accrual through age 54, when his total pension wealth will be
less than $13,000. In 1995, however, when the person is 55 and eligible for
early retirement, it will increase by almost $30,000 to a total of over
$47,000. In the next few years accrual is less than $7,000 per year. The age-14-
55 spike in accrual suggests a potential concentration of retirement among
this group at age 55 (in 1995). But the actual pension that would be received
is still very small, only about 12 percent of salary (from tables not shown).
Thus retirement may be unlikely.
Managers of the same age, but hired 10 years early may be much more
likely to retire in that year. (Figures 4a and 4b.) They experience a much
sharper increase in pension wealth in 1985, from just under $42,000 to over
$133,000. The pension benefit to wage replacement rate at 55 for this group
is about 26 percent. But accrual after 55 remains positive for this group;
pension wealth increases to almost $209,000 by age 60. Thus pension wealth
accrual may still provide a substantial incentive to remain with the firm.
In contrast, persons born in 1920 and hired by the firm at age 40 (in
1960) will have essentially no pension accrual in 1985, and, indeed, it will
become negative in a few years. (Figures 5a and 5b.) Earnings for this group
are declining as well. One might think that persons who are in this group and
are still working would be likely to retire. But, if still working, they
chose not to retire earlier, when compensation from continued work began to
decline. They would have been eligible for early retirement at age 55 (in
1975), when they had been employed for 15 years.
At that time they would have faced earnings and pension accrual
profiles like those shown in figures 6a and 6b. The group described in these
graphs was born and hired 10 years later (in 1930 and 1970 respectively) and
thus had 15 years of service at age 55 (in 1985), when pension accrual was at
a maximum. Thereafter, accrual declines and becomes negative around age 65,
after 25 years of service. That the group pictured in figure 5 didn't retire
earlier may suggest that their preferences are such that they are also not
likely to retire in a given subsequent year either. They may want to work-15-
more than others and that's why they didn't retire when pension accrual and
earnings started to decline. In addition, however, the group had not
accumulated substantial pension wealth at any time, even before it began to
decline, and thus may always have been in a poor position to leave the labor
force.
E. Variation by Employee Type
The pension accrual profiles for other employee groups lookvery much
like those described above. Accrual is minimal during the firstyears of
service. There is typically a discontinuous increase in pension wealth atage
55. And accrual typically becomes negative after 30 years of service,
sometimes before that. Social Security accrual becomes negative after 65.
The major differences among the groups stem from different age-earnings
profiles. An illustration of the similarity and difference is provided by
graphs like that in figure 2, but for different employee groups. They are
shown in figures 7 through 11 for male managers, salesmen, saleswomen, male
office workers, and female office workers, respectively. (The graphs for male
managers are reproduced here for ease of comparison.) In each case the data
pertain to persons born in 1960 and hired in 1980. Thus they all pertain to
compensation over the life cycle for persons who remain in the firm. As is
clear from the graphs, the accrual profiles are qualitatively similar; but
there are some important differences.
First, managers earn more than the other employee groups. The wage
earnings profiles also differ in shape. The peak earnings for managers occurs
at age 59. At age 66, if they still are in the labor force, 45 percent of
their wage earnings is offset by negative pension and Social Security accrual.
The earnings of salesmen peak much earlier, at age 50. At age 66, almost 95-16-
percent of their wage earnings are offset by loss in pension and Social
Security wealth. Thus this effect creates a greater incentive for the
salesmen than for the managers to retire after age 65. The peak wage
earnings for saleswomen occurs at age 57; at 66 almost 75 percent of their
wage earnings is offset by pension and Social Security wealth losses. The
peak earnings for male and female office workers occurs at ages 59 and 62,
respectively. At age 66, 48 and 46 percent, respectively, of their earnings
would be offset by loss in pension and Social Security wealth.
The budget constraints for all groups show a discontinuous jump at age
55, but it seems most pronounced for managers. The budget constraint for
salesmen is essentially flat after 65; their net compensation after 65 is
virtually zero. The same is true for saleswomen. The net compensation of
managers and male office workers is positive, but declining rapidly at age 65,
and the budget constraints for these two groups become flatter after 65. The
budget constraint nonlinearities seem to be the least pronounced for female
office workers.
4Managerial compensation is primarily in the form of salary, whereas the
compensation of salesmen is in the form of commissions to a large extent.
They may be more like self-employed or piece rate workers. In particular,
their earnings may be determined to a large extent by the number of hours that
they choose to work. This may also effect the relationship between
compensation and retirement. Firm officials inform us, however, that most
salespeople work only for the Firm. To the extent that the numbers of hours
that they work do not decline substantially with the wage, profiles reflect
age-productivity profiles.
5There should be no presumption that men and women classified by us as
office workers are performing the same jobs. The classification does not
assure that.-17-
II. The Prediction of Earnings of the Firm's Workers
Data are available for each worker employed in the firm from the
beginning of 1980 through the end of 1984. Most werein the firm in more than
one year and many for all years. These years define the sample. Earnings for
anyone in the sample are available beginning in 1969 if the person was
employed then or beginning in the year that the person joined the firm 51 it
was after 1969. Thus it is possible to follow the same person for up to 17
years. In particular, it is possible to estimate individual-specific earnings
effects. By combining data for workers of different ages and with different
years of service in the firm, it is possible to predict earnings. We use
these predicted earnings in considering whether a person leaves the firm in a
given sample year, like 1980. The probability of departure in a given year is
related to how much the person would have earned during that year and on
pension and Social Security accrual during that year. In future estimation,
we will consider not only next year's earnings and pension and Social Security
accrual, but also the effects of future earnings and pension and Social
Security accrual.
Because earnings in the first and last years in the firm are likely to
represent pay for only part of the year, they are excluded in the estimation
of earnings. To be included, a person must have earnings data for at least
three years. Workers with three years of data would have only one usable
earnings observation. This group must be distinguished in the estimation
procedure. Although persons with fewer than three years of earnings are not
used in the estimation of earnings equations, they are included in the
analysis of retirement discussed in section III. In this section the earnings-18-
estimation procedure is discussed first and then the results are presented.
In addition to their use in the subsequent prediction of retirement, the
earnings results are of considerable interest in their ownright.It is rare
to have access to earnings data for the same persons over such a long period.
It is often claimed, for example, that real wage earnings decline late in a
person's working life. We are able to determine with relative certainty
whether this is true for this firm.
A. The Method
Earnings histories from 1969 are available for workers employed during
the period 1980 through 1984. To explain the main features of the estimation
procedure, figure 12 describes the earnings of two persons who are in the data
set for seven years. The first person is age 40 to 46 over these seven years,
and the second is age 45 to 51. (They could also have different years of
service, but that is ignored in this example.) Earnings by age for the
typical person in the firm are represented by the solid line in the middle of
the graph. The first person has higher earnings than the average employee.
His earnings exceed those of the typical person by an amount u1, the
individual-specific earnings effect for person 1. It may arise, for example,
because this person works harder than the typical employee or because he has
greater ability or more training.Earnings for person 1 fluctuate from year
to year, however. The deviations with age from the central tendency of his
earnings, indicated by the person 1 average, are indicated by alt' where t
indicates the deviation in year t. Future earnings for person 1 must be
estimated for our analysis. They are indicated by the dashed part of the
line. They depend on u1 and on the estimated relationship between age and
earnings, which, aside from the individual-specific term, is assumed to be the-19-
same for individuals within a sex-occupation group. The earnings model is
presented more formally in the following sections.
1. Earnings Equation Specification
To simplify the presentation, we include only one right-hand variable,
age. In practice estimation is based on age and years of service. The exact
specification is presented below. An earnings equation that captures the
ideas discussed above is:
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The last approximation is a reminder that because of the nonlinear
relationship between earnings and age, the expected value of exp[7j] is not
equal to 1, even though the expected value of is 0.
In addition to the parameters ,thevariances of u and ,arealso of
interest. The first indicates the systematic earnings variation across
individuals due to individual-specific effects. The second is a measure of
the extent of non-systematic variation.The method of estimation used here
does not allow for the possibility that the individual-specific terms u may be
correlated with age. For example, it may be that persons whose earnings are
higher, because of the attributes u, are more likely to continue working at
older ages. We did obtain such estimates using a differencing procedure. Rut
for our purposes the procedure has two important shortcomings: First, it
means that certain age and service parameters are not identified. Second, it
imposes the rate of salary increase by age that existed over the period of the
data, because this relationship depends only on changes in earnings over the
period of the data. (The method we use allows the effect of age to be
determined in part by comparison of the earnings of workers with very
different ages.) This increase is apparently low relative to longer term
increases, and hence may imply expected future increases with age and service
that are too low. We also discovered that individual specific terms based on
the method that we have used are not correlated with firm departure rates.
2. Estimation Method
Estimation of equation (4) yields residuals
2
(5) —inEt - - -
Theestimated variance of e is given bye2
2 i,t
(6) —nj-k
where n is the number of observations for person i and k is the number of
parameters (3 in this example). To obtain estimates of additional parameters
of interest we need to distinguish persons with more than one observation from
those with only 1.
a.Using Persons With n >1













where I is the number of persons in the sample (in this instance those with
n ￿2),and
(10) — -
b.For Persons With n —1.
If a person has only one observation we can't distinguish i'fromu,
since we don't observe any variation around an average. First note that if u






















If were 0 and we observed we would assume it represented entirely an
individual specific effect u. If were 0, we would assume the were
equal to the random term 'iit and that there was no individual effect u.
Lettingetbe the sample analog of and using the estimates in (2) and (4)








For estimation of the likelihood that a person will retire in the next
year, we need to use predicted earnings in that year. For future analysis we
will need to predict earnings in subsequent years as veil. The predictions
are given by





For out-of-sample estimates, jLwouldbe predicted from future age, for
example.
6
d. The Estimated Components of Earnings
To consider how much earnings deviate from what might be predicted for
that person, or from what that person himself might predict, it is useful to
divide earnings into expected and unexpected components. We do that by
defining
6Simulated actual future earnings could beobtined by taking a random
draw it from the estimate distribution of 'l N(O, ),foreach future year
and using -
'7
/it+hhi'1it • Ete e
If Et were used in equation (4) instead of in Ext, there is no need to use
the non-linearity correction.-24-
(13) in Ej —it++ it
it + —"permanent"or "expected" component
'it —"transitory"or ttunexpectedn component
These definitions do not necessarily correspond to usual definitions of
permanent versus transitory income, so the expected versus unexpected




Iiti1it'-'i'it +e (e -1)
permanent +transitory
componentcomponent
3.A More Detailed Specification of the Earnings Function
Earnings were predicted using the following variables:
Age
Age Squared
Age Squared x Service
Service
Service Squared
Service Squared x Age
Age x Service
Age Squared x Service Squared
Calendar Year Variables for 1969 .1979 and 198l...,l983.
The calendar year variables pick up changes in real earnings over time. Each
of the year estimates is relative to the 1980 base.-25-
4. Earnings Function Estimates
The estimated earnings function parameters are shown in table 8. The
implications of the estimates are shown in figures 12a through l2e,
distinguished by employee group. Figure 12a, for example, shows earnings
profiles for managers by age of hire in 1980, where the nine profiles on the
graph pertain to persons hired at successively older ages- -from 20 to 60 in
five-year intervals. Earnings are calculated through age 70 for each cohort.
First, it is clear that, for any age, earnings increase substantially with
years of service. Earnings at the time of hire increase with age, but the
bulk of the difference in earnings is accounted for by years of service in the
firm. For example, persons who are 55 and just hired (profile 8) earn much
less than those who are 55, but have been working for the firm since age 20
(profile 1). Finally, the decline in earnings for older workers is much
greater for long-term employees than for those who have been hired recently.
Similar patterns apply to other employee groups, but with some
significant variations. The earnings of male office workers at the time of
hire vary greatly by age, increasing and then declining rapidly. The
importance of these profiles for our work is that future expected earnings
depend in an important way on the age and years of service of an employee, and
the employee group.
In our prediction of earnings beyond 1984 we use the 1984 year dummy and
add a 1.5 percent real wage growth factor; i.e., the predicted earnings for
year t is the predicted earnings for 1984 times (l.5)(t-l984).
III. The Relationship between Retirement. Age, and Years of Service
In this section, the relationship of retirement to age and years of
service is described. The intention is to consider the extent to which-26-
retirement behavior is consistent, by economic reasoning, with the budget
constraints described in section II. To do this, we consider in detail
empirical hazard rates by age and years of service. These results will serve
as a guide to future development and estimation of more formal models of
retirement. They are the empirical regularities with which the models must be
consistent. In addition, however, this extensive descriptive analysis
supports several initial conclusions:
• The favorable early retirement benefits have a very strong effect on
departures from the firm, possibly increasing departure rates between
ages 55 and 60 by as much as 30 percentage points (e.g. from 14 to 44
percent).
• The loss in compensation do to negative pension accrual for many
employees after age 60 and negative Social Security accrual after age
65 apparently also induce departure; only 58 percent of those employed
at age 54 remain through age 59, and only 21 percent of those employed
at 59 remain through 64. About half of the few remaining at 65 retire
at that age.
• The special early retirement incentive offered in one year increased
departure rates very substantially.
A. Empirical Hazard Rates
Hazard rates by age and years of service are shown for all employees
combined in table 9. The yearly hazard rate is the proportion of those
employeed at the beginning of the year that retires- -more strictly speaking,
leaves the firm- -during the forthcoming year. Several aspects of the data
stand out. There is substantial turnover in the first 9 years of employment,
especially during the first five years. On average, about 15 percent of those
employed five years or less leave in a given year. The table shows rates only
for employees 40 and older. The departure rates are somewhat higher for
younger workers, 16 or 17 percent for those employeed 5 years or less and10
to 12 percent for those employed 6 to 9 years. There is a sharp decline in-27-
departure rates at 10 years of service, when employees are about to become
vested in the pension plan. Before the early retirement age, 55, the typical
decline is from 8 or 9 to 4 or 5 percent. After 55, when vesting caries with
it eligibility for early retirement, it is much sharper, often from 10 percent
or more to 3 percent or less.
The availability of early retirement benefits at 55 apparently has a
substantial effect on retirement. Before 55 departure rates are typically
around 2 percent. At 55, they jump to 10 percent or more. It is important to
notice that the departure rates stay at that level until age 60, when there is
another jump in the rate of departure. The jump at 60 corresponds to the age
at which pension accrual becomes negative for many employees. (For those with
25 or more years of service, benefits increase at one instead of two percent
per year. After age 60 with 30 years of service there is no early retirement
reduction; full retirement benefits are available.)
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement benefits,
suppose that if it were not for this inducement, the departure rates would
remain at 3 percent until age 60 instead of the 10 or 12 percent rates that
are observed. (Notice that the departure rates for employees aged 55 to 61
who are in their tenth year of service- -not yet vested and hence not eligible
for early retirement benefits--are also two or three percent on average.)
Departure at 3 percent per year would mean that 14 percent of those who were
employed at 55 would have left before age 60. At a departure rate of 11
percent per year, 44 percent would leave between 55 and 59. Such a
difference, even if only for a small proportion of all firms, can have a very
substantial effect on aggregate labor force participation rates. It is in
part the dramatic fall in labor force participation rates for the older
population that has motivated research such as ours.-28-
The jump in departure rates at 60, especially noticeable for persons with
25 or more years of service, has been mentioned just above. There is another
sharp increase in departure rates at 62 when Social Security benefits are
first available. (There is no sharp kink in the budget constraint at this age
because of the actuarially fair increase in Social Security benefits if their
receipt is postponed until age 65.) The increase at 62 is also noticeable for
employees with less than ten years of service and not yet vested in the firm
pension plan. They can take Social Security benefjts, of course.
Finally, there is a very sharp increase in the departure rate at age 65.
At this age the loss in Social Security benefits with continued work induces a
kink in the budget constraint. As described above, the budget constraint for
many workers becomes essentially flat at this age, due to negative pension
accruals and falling wage earnings, as well as the loss in Social Security
wealth. The fall in wage earnings and pension wealth typically begins at an
earlier age, as emphasized above. It is important to keep in mind that the
large departure rates before 65 mean that most employees have left well before
that age. Thus high departure rates at 65 indicate only that a large
proportion of the few that continue work until 65 retire then. The cumulative
hazard rates below highlight this point.
A more compact version of table 9 is shown in the tabulation below for
salesmen. About 40.7 percent of employees are salesmen and women, about 56.2
percent are office workers, and only 3.1 percent managers. Thus for purposes
of comparison, it is best to have in mind the accrual and budget constraint
graphs for sales and office workers.-29-
Hazard Rates for Salesmen by Age and Years of Service
Years of Service
<1011-1516-2021-2526-30
<50 19 9 5 4 3 -- --
50-54 14 7 4 3 3 2 0
55 11 14 9 11 12 15 --
56-59 14 13 9 11 11 14 --
60 11 12 14 19 14 29 35
61 13 12 13 13 19 32 28
62 12 27 32 38 36 52
-
35
63 20 28 33 36 47 48 56
64 0 37 36 30 36 38 28
65 34 56 51 50 49 47 43
66 17 28 10 34 18 16 12
67 20 16 25 21 8 5 18
These results confirm the findings for all employees discussed above. They
may be summarized briefly:
There is a large increase in the departure rates at the early
retirement age of 55, but only for vested employees, those with at
least 10 years of service. For employees with 16 or more years of
service, the jump in departure rates increases very noticeably with
age.
• The departure rates remain at these higher rates through age 59.
• At age 60, the departure rates increase very precipitously for persons
with 30 or more years service, for whom full benefits are available;
there is no longer an early retirement reduction and subsequent pension
accrual is negative.
• When Social Security benefits become available at 62, the departure
rates increase very sharply, but apparently only for those who are
vested in the firm plan, contrary to the results for all employees
taken together.
• Finally, there is a large increase in departure rates at 65, after
which Social Security accrual rates become strongly negative.-30-
Cumulative hazard rates for all employees are shown below for three
years, together with the rates by age. The cumulative rates are actually one
minus the percent who have departed.
Cumulative and Yearly Hazard Rates
by Calendar Year. Years of Service, and Age
Yearly Hazards Cumulative Hazards
8-10 YOS 11+ YOS 11+ YOS
1980 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983
50 7 3 9797 97
51 9 3 949494
52 3 5 5 5 89 8989
53 0 4 4 4 85 8686
54 4 3 4 2 83 8384
55 5 111210 74 --73
-
75
56 4 12 1410 6663 68
57 2 9 1211 6056 61
58 5 10 14 12 5448 54
59 2 11 20 10 483848
60 4 17 29 17 402740
61 0 17 3218 3318 33
62 8 36 48 31 21 10
-
23
63 14 37 54 37 13 514
64 11 29 49 26 10 2 11
65 25 535845 5 1
--
6
These departure rates were obtained by calculating hazard rates over the next
four years separately for persons who were age 50 in 1980, age 51 in 1980,
•. .. , andage 63 in 1980. Those who were age 50 in 1980 were 51 in 1981,52
in 1983, etc. Thus these calculations yield hazard rates in different years
for employees of the same age. In particular, given employment at age 50, the
cumulative rates show the percent still employeed at older ages. (The
cumulative rates for those aged 50 are all based on the 1980 departure rate of-31-
.031. The rates for those aged 51 are all based on the 1981 rate of .033.
The 1983 rate for those aged 52 is based on the 1982 rate. The rate for those
who were 65 in 1981 is based on the 1983 rate.)
Note first that departure rates of employees who have been in the firm
for only 8 to 10 years,and are not yet vested, are very low at every age, as
emphasized above. And again, the increase in the departure rates at 55, 60,
62, and 65 stands out. Based on the 1981 and 1982 departure rates, only 48
percent of those employed at 50 would still be employeed at 60, and then 17
percent of these would leave. Only 10 percent would remain until age 65 and
then about 50 percent of these would leave.
The data also show the effect of a special early retirement incentive
that was in effect in 1982 only. The incentive program provided a bonus to
employees who were eligible for early retirement in 1982; that is, those who
were vested and were 55 years old or older. The bonus was equivalent to three
months salary for 55 year old employees and increased to 12 months salary for
60 year olds. At age 65, the bonus was 12 months salary for employees with 20
or fewer years of service and declined to 6 months salary for those with 30 to
39 years of service.
It is clear that the effect of the incentive was large. The departure
rates for 1981 and for 1983 are virtually identical. But the rates were much
higher in 1982. For example, the departure rate for 60 year olds was 17
percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 32 percent in 1982. For those age 63, the
departure rate was 37 percent in 1981 and in 1983, but 54 percent in 1982. Of
those employeed at age 50, 40 percent would still have been ernployeed after
age 60 based on the 1981 and 1983 departure rates. Only 27 percent would
remain after age 60 based on the 1982 rates.7
7This comparison may not be precise because the special incentive, were-32-
Even under the normal plan, only 10 percent of those employeed at age 50
would still be employeed at 65. Only 1 percent would remain until 65 with the
special incentive.
IV.Summaryand Conclusions
The provisions of the pension plan in a large corporation have been
described in detail. The implications of the provisions are described by
pension accrual profiles. The pension accrual profiles are set forth together
with standard age-earnings profiles and Social Security accrual profiles in
the form of life-time budget constraints. The plan provides very strong
incentives to retire beginning at age 55. After age 65, negative pension
accruals and negative Social Security accruals effectively impose almost a 100
percent tax rate on wage earnings for many employees of the firm.
Departure rates from the firm have been compared with economic incentives
inherent in the plan provisions. It is clear from this descriptive analysis
that the inducements in the plan provisions to retire early have had a very
substantial effect on departure rates from the firm. Indeed over 50 percent
of those employed by the firm at age 50 leave before 60 and 90 percent before
age 65. The jumps in departure rates at specific ages coincide precisely with
the discontinuities and kink points in the worker compensation profiles that
result from the pension plan provisions together with wage earnings profiles
and Social Security accrual.
A great deal of effort has been devoted to estimating the effect of
Social Security provisions on labor force participation. In particular,
it to be prolonged, would alter the retirement rates prior to each of the ages
considered in 1982..33-
Hausman and Wise [1985], Burtless [1986], and Boskin and Hurd [198] have
attempted to estimate the effect on labor force participation of the increases
in Social Security benefits during the early 1970's. It would appear from the
results here that the effects of these across the board increases in Social
Security benefits are likely to be small relative to the effects of the
private pension provisions. For example, it seems clear that shifting the age
of early retirement from 55 to 60 would have a very dramatic effect on
departure rates. Leaving the early retirement age at 55, but eliminating
negative pension and Social Security accruals thereafter would apparently also
have a substantial effect on retirement rates. Precise estimates of the
effects of such changes will be made in future work.-34-
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 Table 1. Calculation of pension benefits and wealth accrual.
YearAgeYrs.Wage Avg.Normal SS SS Adj.EarlyReduced
Svc. Earn. Ret. Adjrnt.Ret. Ret.Normal
Base Ben. Ben. Reduct.Ret.
FactorBen. Ben.





































































































































































































































































6069 7.9990.81960.2519 10023 010023 0 0.049
7274 7.9990.82430.2745 13167 013167 2057 6.450
8185 7.9990.82940.2993 16250 016250 1741 4.751
9796 7.9990.83510.3262 21346 021346 3334 8.152
10866 7.9990.84150.3555 26004 026004 2510 5.753
13388 7.9990.84850.3875 35216 035216 6205 13.854
95037.9990.85620.4224 27494 8994711744172527 149.855
122107.9990.86480.4604 38891 10504114393214607 28.756
140957.9990.87420.5019 49468 112461161930 4627 8.5 57
169547.9990.88470.5470 65637 12197018760610187 17.458
198807.9990.89630.5963 84994 126740211734 6645 10.659
233177.9990.90920.6499110219 128422238640 7202 10.860
253957.9990.92350.7084132909 116203249112-10097 -14.3 61
276877.9990.93950.7722 160676 98801259477-11060 -14.8 62




403497.6461.00001.0000308518 0308518-12804 -14.0 67
427457.4661.00001.0000319112 0319112-15754 -16.8 68
44932 7.2811.00001.0000327147 0327147-18978 -19.9 69
468347.0931.00001.0000332181 0332181-22394 -23.470Table 2. Accrual in Pension Wealth by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 0 0 0 0 0 508 0 0 835 2686
1981 0 0 0 0 0 380 0 0 562 2059
1982 0 0 0 0 0 770 0 0 1413 3716
1983 0 0 0 0 0 582 0 0 1079 2710
1984 0 0 1278 0 2470 1494 0 2968 3053 6530
1985 0 0 251 0 475 767 01822626481 72527
1986 0 0 663 0 1335 2090 0 5616 8227 13781
1987 0 0 353 0 651 994 0 2593 3691 4118
1988 0 0 663 0 1289 1978 0 4105 5874 8553
1989 1008 2158 767 4037 1479 232322194 3745 5342 5263
1990 194 388 890 688 1709 2676 831 3280 4726 5382
1991 341 690 1051 1297 2174 3168 1060 1685 2376 -7118
1992 418 845 1260 1601 2675 3820 609 1389 2029 -7356
1993 504 1016 1485 2021 3202 4515 -89 683 1312 -8127
1994 606 1220 1756 2603 3851 5351 -908 -155 419 -8902
1995 716 1441 2043296394072782953 -2067-1384-3515 -10152
1996 843 1695 2555 7130 9538 9898 5217 3628 -939 -5346
1997 987 1986 2992 7349 9672 11334 4579 2855-1652 -6363
1998 1153 2422 3499 7437 9641 10665 3902 2041-2384 -7386
1999 1342 2969 4085 7377 9426 7844 3186 1187-3129 -8394
2000 1558 3492 3900 7140 6196 8643 2423 -1882-3874 -9344
2001 1807 4095 4481 4432 2198 -6178 0 0 0 0
2002 2093 4790 5149 3750 1206 -7237 0 0 0 0
2003 2517 5587 5904 2870 -15-8380 0 0 0 0
2004 3037 6502 6763 1791 4378 -9658 0 0 0 0
2005 291895433 117775 -2553-8981 -11004 0 0 0 0
2006 336111955 14674 -1993 -4042 -6843 0 0 0 0
2007 387213705 16840 -2784 -4988 -7994 0 0 0 0
2008 446113022 15944 -3601 -5955 -9155 0 0 0 0
2009 5139 9809 11879 -4436-6930 -10299 0 0 0 0
2010 591010923 13211 -5265-7875 -11375 0 0 0 0
2011 6792 -6583 -8668 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 7801-7785 -10184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 8940-9069 -11809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014 10223 -10418 -13531 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015168439 -11848 -15345 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016 21859-8684 -12662 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2017 25137-9994 -14317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2018 23904 -11319 -15955 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019 17968 -12627 -17524 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020 19964 -13849 -18933 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021-12355 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022-14649 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023-17087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024-19659 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025-22287 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026-21570 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027-24026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028-26391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029-28576 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





1975 1970 1960 1950
1980 0 0 1178 5146 7442
1981 0 0 -616 -105 -9132
1982 0 0 451 2175 -5043
1983 0 0 -2739-2721 -13235
1984 0 5090 658 3575 -2995
1985 0 -5357 -5328-8152 -14936
1986 0 0 8151 3728 831
1987 0 0 2108-4957 -10017
1988 0 4176 3987 -1882 -6347
1989 0 5038 2968-3049 -7920
1990 0 4265 2109 -3889 -8984
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0
YearTable 3.Pension Wealth by Year of girth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 0 0 0 0 0 2356 0 0 374717190
1981 0 0 0 0 0 2741 0 0 431319221
1982 0 0 0 0 0 3654 0 0 596923790
1983 0 0 0 0 0 4493 0 0 748028076
1984 0 0 1393 0 2692 6327 0 32351114936475
1985 0 0 1740 0 3350 7494 0 2327140597 117141
1986 0 0 2513 0 4901 9985 0 3005150713 135785
1987 0 0 2969 0 575011351 0 3372856172 144117
1988 0 0 3775 0 7317 13828 0 3915764165 157520
1989 1098 2352 4718 4400 913616751 241924434771802 167710
1990 1341 2842 5821 527411257 20142257814917578983 178316
1991 1750 3675 7132 6837139462416627668 5240783814 175617
-, 1f177rt1C 'flh1 CLAi.OO(r i-,r i99z zz56 '4/Vu BiOi 8iio £uj.1L'L.LJJJ'+U'+OO,?7LI.LIV
1993 2869 594010572 11227212343475529840 5771392326 168587
1994 3610 743912785 143822603341572 29695 5917895397 163658
1995 4493 9220153734709571162 133166 28282 5934394264 157222
1996 5539 1132918594 5620183574 147728 347706498095910 155849
1997 6772 13814223816580296481 164262407466993196824 153324
1998 8220168442682775768 109717 180531461517413396962 149607
1999 9915205583204085956 123101 194197509317752796299 144698
2000 11894249463719796169 133336 209110550127766994800 138605
2001 142013011643135 103721 139506 208294 0 0 0 0
2002 168843619049968 110745 144770 206303 0 0 0 0
2003 201054330457817 117006 148850 203005 0 0 0 0
2004 239845161666824 122269 157833 198220 0 0 0 0
2005 27844 157100 197093 122952 152517 191845 0 0 0 0
2006 32295 174574 218662 124257 152424 189811 0 0 0 0
2007 37429 194452 243204 124738 151301 186468 0 0 0 0
2008 43351 214150 267468 124345 149092 181767 0 0 0 0
2009 50180 230907 287992 123032 145761 175690 0 0 0 0
2010 58041 249344 310538 120773 141301 168260 0 0 0 0
2011 67087 249226 309879 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 77489 247793 307546 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 89425 244918 303375 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014103100 240494 297212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015289618 234391 288904 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016321636 231555 283275 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2017358138 227214 275686 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2018394330 221307 266097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019425077 213809 254529 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020458866 204763 241094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021458390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022455392 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023449660 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024440956 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025429144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026417780 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027403414 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028386063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029365842 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





1975 1970 1960 1950
1980 0 02027069954 157647
1981 0 0 1934768974 145742
1982 0 02036173204 144173
1983 0 01851574336 137819
1984 0 55492007781625 140844
1985 0 0153227701.. 131943
1986 0 02463983260 136584
1987 0 02763480214 129531
1988 0 4552 3276380434 126280
1989 0101733692579385 121217
1990 0 151094026777390 114850
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0
YearYear
Table 4. Social Security Accrual by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 0 1696 2286 398 455 467 936 982 1022 1071
1981 0 235 338 474 567 635 1121 1240 1291 1356
1982 0 289 421 571 676 742 1346 1462 1524 802
1983 0 364 522 730 863 954 1730 1893 1978 2137
1984 0 293 390 588 273 734 1394 1489 1525 1673
1985 0 129 382 612 767 760 1-471 1578 1611 1777
1986 0 419 440 751 910 919 1822 1949 2003 2200
1987 0 520 560 971 1165 1199 2385 2577 1232 2914
1988 0 588 608 1098 1294 1334 2725 2930 3129 3313
1989 0 664 664 1242 1441 1488 3117 3338 3566 3774
1990 3965 737 729 1404 1609 1663 3568 3810 4072 4308
1991 358 801 804 690 1801 1863 4090 2095 4661 4929
1992 382 875 889 1865 2022 2092 4696 5103 5349 5653
1993 416 961 985 2096 2273 2353 5402 5878 6158 6504
1994 456 1060 1093 2361 2562 2653 6330 6815 7169 7589
1995 503 1173 1216 2665 2892 2994 6924 7376 7801 8257
1996 556 1301 1355 3015 3271 3387 -6909 -7275 -7825 -8497
1997 616 1448 1512 3418 3709 3839 -6444 -6784-7298 -7925
1998 683 1614 1689 3885 4213 4361 -6006 -6324 -6802 -7387
1999 758 1803 1891 4426 4797 4965-5600 -5896-6343 -6888
2000 841 2018 2119 5052 5472 5662 -5224 -5501-5917 -6425
2001 935 2263 2378 5779 6256 6471 0 0 0 0
2002 1040 2542 2674 6628 7169 7413 0 0 0 0
2003 1158 2861 3010 7624 8241 8518 0 0 0 0
2004 1291 3225 3394 8900 9648 9986 0 0 0 0
2005 1440 3641 3832 9684 1049610863 0 0 0 0
2006 1607 4119 4334-10010-11207-11747 0 0 0 0
2007 1796 4668 4912 -9335-10452-10956 0 0 0 0
2008 2009 5302 5578 -8702 -9743-10212 0 0 0 0
2009 2251 6034 6346 -8114 -9085 -9522 0 0 0 0
2010 2524 6878 7232 -7569 -8475 -8883 0 0 0 0
2011 2834 7858 8259 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 3188 8999 9454 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 359010337 10855 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014 40491213712766 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015 45711320113885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016 5169-14510-15516 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2017 5858-13532-14471 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2018 6651-12614-13489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019 7566-11761-12577 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020 8622-10972-11733 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021 9844 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022 11265 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023 12933 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024 15222 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025 16557 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026-18659 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0



























1975 1970 1960 1950
1980 2936 3000 3057 3125 1263
1981 3726 3808 3880 2013 4053
1982 4460 4557 4644 4843 4878
1983 5850 5982 3317 6383 6431
1984 4893 4974 5206 5332 5361
1985 5023 1436 5307 5483 5510
1986 -5991 -5837-6118 -6463 -6540
1987 -5587 -5443-5706 -6028 -6100
1988 -5208 -5074-5319 -5618 -5686
1989 -4856 -4731 -4959 -5238 -5301
1990 -4530 -4413 -4627 -4887 -4945
1991 0 0 0 0 0
I' U V U V V
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0
YearTable 5. Social Security Wealth by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 0 1849 2491 3818 4854 5277 .9217105441170313137
1981 0 2082 2828 4287 5412 590510325 117651296614452
1982 0 2453 3364 5025 6295 687312070 136761497715716
1983 0 2988 4121 6102 7588 829714633 165051797118925
1984 0 3444 4734 7021 8232 947616820 188812045421613
1985 0 3765 5398 8055 9499 1080119305 215902328124682
1986 0 4328 6031 910110760121092183724326 2612327779
1987 0 5017 681110417 123341375925054278232820631742
1988 0 5800 766711909 14094 1560328734 318043241536252
1989 0 6689 860713599160621766632944 363423721841390
1990 4321 7681 96451551418270 1997837764415224270847255
1991 4834 8771 1079516706 207522257643294449844900053969
1992 5387 9973 1206919213 235432549549638518205621861658
1993 5992 113031348422040266862878056928596916451870489







2001 13836291613256263728 7257976568 0 0 0 0
2002 153623275836398727578244886815 0 0 0 0
2003 170593680340709831269376398557 0 0 0 0
2004 18948413604556195178 106932 112229 0 0 0 0
2005 210544650251030 108431 121404 127251 0 0 0 0
2006 234025230657197 100587 112621 118045 0 0 0 0
2007 26021588746416993258 104415 109444 0 0 0 0
2008 2894866320720658641396751 101410 0 0 0 0
2009 322227477581023800168958993904 0 0 0 0
2010 358848438791198740298288686877 0 0 0 0
2011 3998995342 102782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 44595 107848 115995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 49770 122167 131108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014 55592 138854 148734 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015 62149 157176 168081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016 69541 145806 155922 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2017 77894 135183 144562 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2018 87349 125260 133950 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019 98068 115986 124033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020110241 107308 114753 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021124092 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022139882 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023157939 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024179001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025202114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026187497 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027173836 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028161075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029149149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





1975 1970 1960 1950
1980 30795 32286 33612 3521833536










1991 0 0 0 0 0
A A A A A iy, V V V U
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0
YearTable 6. Wage Earnings by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 2040524053 33021 27894340204071231825349453866648446
1981 2285226082 34967294033535441853 32739356663922648813
1982 2531228057 36807 308193658642898 33548362893969349098
1983 2775729965 38542 32141377204385834256368194007449300
1984 30615322714077433869393424541035390 378184097750156
1985 334793454342948 3553540904469133&447387414180350919















2001 731786381472206520235587961148 0 0 0 0
2002 754156515173676 521235573960728 0 0 0 0
2003 776676640275052 520475538160028 0 0 0 0
2004 799316755076307 517795478359027 0 0 0 0
2005 822136858177417 513055393157709 0 0 0 0
2006 845026947178349 506095281056063 0 0 0 0
2007 8679670199 79069496785141054084 0 0 0 0
2008 89081 70739 795434850349727 51778 0 0 0 0
2009 9134771067 79735470814776449160 0 0 0 0
2010 9356771151 79604454084552646251 0 0 0 0
2011 9572170965 79114 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 9777470478 78230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 9969469665 76922 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
201410143868503 75168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20151029596697472952 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20161042026506270267 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20171051156276667124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20181056386009063546 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20191057125705159572 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20201052775367555254 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021104279 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2022102671 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023100415 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024 97484 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025 93875 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026 89598 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027 84690 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028 79209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029 73239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





1980 35723 35788 365194018647598
1981 36006 35902 364703979446774
1982 36188 35919 363233928045765
1983 36276 35845 360803864244568
1984 36819 36215 362773844643828
1985 37271 36488 363623809242847
1986 37632 36660 3633337574 1624
1987 37900 36728 361813688540157
1988 38066 36679 358953601438445
1989 38124 36507 354673495636499
1990 38067 36205 348913371334339
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0Table 7.Cumulated Earnings by Year of Birth and Year
of Hire for Managers
Born
Hired
1960 1950 1940 1930
1980 1980 1975 1980 1975 1970 1980 1975 1970 1960
1980 20405240533302127894340204071231825349453866648446
1981 43257501356798757297693748256564564706117789297258
1982 6856978192 10479588116 105960 12546398112 106900 117585 146356
1983 96326 108157 143337 120257 143679 169320 132368 143719 157659 195656
1984126941 140428 184111 154126 183022 214730 167758 181537 198636 245812
1985160419 174970 227059 189661 223926 261644 20.4205 220277 240439 296731
1986196750 211745 272127 226801 266335 310017 241631 259865 282989 348310
1987235905 250750 319267 265486 310194 359811 279962 300224 326205 400432
1988277838 291797 368425 305649 355444 410979 319114 341266 369990 452956
1989322490 334963 419553 347221 402025 463472 359000 382899 414239 505721
1990369799 380146 472609 390134 449874 517238 399530 425026 458838 558547
1991419703 427293 527560 434321 498933 572225 440613 467543 503665 611237
1992472132 476345 584369 479708 549132 628365 482147 510333 548579 663567
1993527021 527245 643004 526216 600394 685581 524020 553268 593426 715290
1994584313 579942 703442 573770 652640 743787 566118 596214 638043 766151
1995643958 634387 765658 622283 705782 802880 608318 639024 682250 815877
1996705913 690527 829626 671666 759717 862740 650484 681537 725857 864183
1997770143 748313 895321 721817 814332 923228 692472 723585 768662 910785
1998836623 807692 962710 772629 869498 984181 734128 764987 810456 955400
1999905341 868612 1031757 823981 925071 1045417 775289 805557 851024 997759
2000976286 931010 1102412 875741 980887 1106724 815782 845099 890149 1037610
2001 1049464 994824 1174617 927764 1036766 1167871 0 0 0 0
2002 1124879 1059974 1248293 979886 1092505 1228598 0 0 0 0
2003 1202545 1126376 1323345 1031934 1147885 1288626 0 0 0 0
2004 1282476 1193926 1399652 1083712 1202667 1347652 0 0 0 0
2005 1364688 1262507 1477069 1135017 1256598 1405361 0 0 0 0
2006 1449190 1331987 1555417 1185625 1309408 1461423 0 0 0 0
2007 1535985 1402176 1634486 1235302 1360818 1515506 0 0 0 0
2008 1625066 1472915 1714028 1283805 1410544 1567283 0 0 0 0
2009 1716412 1543982 1793763 1330886 1458307 1616442 0 0 0 0
2010 1809979 1615133 1873366 1376293 1503833 1662692 0 0 0 0
2011 1905700 1686097 1952480 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2012 2003474 1756574 2030709 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013 2013168 1826239 2107631 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014 2204605 1894742 2182799 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015 2307564 1961716 2255750 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2016 2411765 2026778 2326016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2017 2516879 2089544 2393140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2018 2622516 2149634 2456686 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2019 2728227 2206684 2516257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2020 2833503 2260359 2571510 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2021 2937782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20223040452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2023 3140866 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2024 3238350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2025 3332224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2026 3421822 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2027 3506511 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2028 3585719 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2029 3658958 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





1975 1970 1960 1950
1980 35723 35788 365194018647598
1981 71728 71690729907998094372
1982107916 107609 109312 119259 140137
1983144193 143453 145392 157901 184704
1984181012 179669 181669 196348 228532
1985218283 216157 218031 234440 271379
1986255915 252817 254364 272014 313003
1987293815 289545 290545 308900 353159
1988331881 326224 326440 344913 391604
1989370005 362731 361907 379870 428104
1990408072 398936 396799 413582 462442
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0
1994 0 0 0 0 0
1995 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0 0 0 0 0
1997 0 0 0 0 0
1998 0 0 0 0 0
1999 0 0 0 0 0
2000 0 0 0 0 0
2001 0 0 0 0 0
2002 0 0 0 0 0
2003 0 0 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0 0 0
2006 0 0 0 0 0
2007 0 0 0 0 0
2008 0 0 0 0 0
2009 0 0 0 0 0
2010 0 0 0 0 0
2011 0 0 0 0 0
2012 0 0 0 0 0
2013 0 0 0 0 0
2014 0 0 0 0 0
2015 0 0 0 0 0
2016 0 0 0 0 0
2017 0 0 0 0 0
2018 0 0 0 0 0
2019 0 0 0 0 0
2020 0 0 0 0 0
2021 0 0 0 0 0
2022 0 0 0 0 0
2023 0 0 0 0 0
2024 0 0 0 0 0
2025 0 0 0 0 0
2026 0 0 0 0 0
2027 0 0 0 0 0
2028 0 0 0 0 0
2029 0 0 0 0 0
2030 0 0 0 0 0





Variable Managers Salesmen Saleswomen Workers Workers
Constant 9.28 8.87 8.65 6.80 8.39
(122.2) (303.6) (77.0) (210.9) (826.6)
A 0.021 0.037 0.042 0.16 0.45
(4.8) (23.5) (7.0) (83.3) (71.6)
A2 -.000082 -0.00041 -0.00051 -0.0019 -0.00057
(-1.4) (-20.7) (-6.5) (-77.2) (-66.3)
A2.S 0.000021 0.000064 -0.000047 0.000044 0.000029
(3.0) (19.7) (-2.0) (12.9) (20.1)
S 0.18 0.20 -0.036 0.10 0.10
(14.0) (31.5) (-0.9) (17.5) (48.7)
S2 -0.01 -0.0044 -0.0086 -0.0060 -0.0031
(-7.8) (-11.5) (-2.9) (-19.8) (-24.4)
S2.A 0.00020 0.00017 0.00023 0.00018 0.00010
(7.5) (11.9) (1.8) (16.7) (21.5)
A.S -0.0043 -0.0068 0.0040 -0.0033 -0.0030
(-7.1) (-23.8) (2.0) (-11.5) (-26.3)
A2.S2 -0.0000016 -0.0000017-0.0000016 -0.0000016 -9.035
(-6.5) (-12.7) (-1.2) (-15.7) (-19.5)
1969 0.11 0.15 -0.027 0.031 0.039
(9.4) (31.4) (-0.6) (3.8) (11.2)
1970 0.16 0.19 -0.014 0.063 0.058
(14.1) (38.8) (-0.3) (7.8) (17.5)
1971 0.19 0.19 0.0036 0.062 0.036
(17.2) (39.6) (0.1) (8.0) (11.5)
1972 0.21 0.21 -0.012 0.088 0.065
(19.1) (45.6) (-0.3) (11.6) (21.3)
1973 0.21 0.21 0.0027 0.094 0.076




Variable Managers Salesmen Saleswomen Workers Workers
1974 0.16 0.20 -0.0074 0.079 0.069
(15.2) (44.3) (-0.2) (11.0) (24.6)
1975 0.10 0.14 -0.012 0.071 0.049
(9.7) (31.6) (-0.4) (10.2) (18.0)
1976 0.15 0.16 0.042 0.12 0.11
(14.2) (36.0) (1.6) (17.5) (41.1)
1977 0.14 0.16 0.094 0.10 0.084
(13.6) (36.1) (4.2) (15.4) (33.6)
1978 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.078
(17.7) (41.9) (6.7) (14.3) (32.3)
1979 0.13 0.10 0.064 0.058 0.044
(13.5) (24.6) (3.7) (9.0) (18.8)
1980
1981 0.03 0.0091 0.025 0.021 0.013
(3.0) (2.1) (1.5) (3.3) (5.6)
1982 -0.0086 -0.077 -0.033 0.033 0.012
(-0.9) (-18.0) (-2.1) (5.1) (5.1)
1983 0.0028 -0.099 -0.041 0.073 0.066
(-0.3) (-23.0) (-2.6) (11.3) (28.4)
1984 0.068 -0.11 -0.050 0.0078 0.032
(7.0) (-25.2) (-3.3) (1.2) (13.8)
0.135 0.155 0.163 0.168 0.065
E
0.083 0.140 0.110 0.150 0.06
U
0.52 0.015 0.053 0.018 0.005
n
a. t-statistics are in parentheses.Table 9. Empirical Hazard Rates, by Age and Years of Service,
All Employee Groups (percent)
Years of Service
6- 11- 16-21-
Age 5 9 1015 20 23 24 2526 2728293031+
40 15 8 5 7
41 14 9 5 7
42 1410 8 8
43 15 7 6 5
44 13 8 5 7
45 11 7 5 6
46 12 9 3 5
47 14 8 8 5
48 12 7 5 6
49 14 9 4 7
50 14 8 4 6
51 14 9 3 5
52 11 7 5 6
53 12 7 4 7
54 11 7 4 6
4 3 0
5 5 3 5
4 2 2 2 0 0
4 4 4 3 2 0 0 0
3 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 0
6 4 3 1 4 2 3 5 0 .5
3 4 4 1 0 5 2 2 0 0
4 3 3 4 4 4 0 4 2 0
4 4 2 5 1 2 4 2 3 2
4 3 5 1 1 1 1 2 0 0
4 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 2 3
3 3 5 2 3 4 2 2 2 5
4 4 2 4 2 4 1 3 6 6
4 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
4 2 4 2 2 3 1 0 1 3
55 9 5 411 9 11 131013 11 12 7 9 9
56 11 6 6 12 11 12 7 811 11 12 16 14 12
57 1210 111 8 9 10 8 9 9 314 11 11
58 1310 2 8 8 12 13 1113 15 9 10 13 12
59 7 10 2 17 8 11 17 141314 910 12 15
60 9 9 3 15 12 19 16 1720 16 20 15 19 26
61 9 7 2 16 17 15 19 1225 16 23 21 24 30
62 11 15 7 27 34 37 34 333840423430 41
63 14 18 4 33 35 37 43 354341 62 3347 40
64 5 8 3 36 33 34 18 3226 2742 5341 34
65 12 3545 57 52 54 44 5557705054 69 59
66 26 1725 16 16 43 50 1620253833 9 24
67 13 2818 32 17 29 01421 0133350 21
68 13 5050 15 25 11 050 029 0 0 0 12